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Abstract
This study deals with comparative statics of the consumer's demand. According to Lan-
caster [1966, Journal of Political Economy ], a utility function should be de¯ned on the set of
all characteristics that a®ect well-being of the consumer and these characteristics should be
derived by consuming commodities. We show the su±cient condition for monotone compara-
tive statics of the demand for characteristics and investigate the properties of the demand for
commodities by considering the relationship between characteristics and commodities. We do
not restrict the domain of a utility function and price systems, that is, the set of characteristics,
to the Euclidean space. In particular, we allow discrete choice and nonlinear price systems.
This theory enables us to predict the properties of the demand for the commodities that are
not present in the market, such as new commodities. Our su±cient condition on a direct utility
function can be characterized by the properties of the welfare variations for the change in the
level of characteristics, which are more transparent and easier to verify. Further, the results of
this study are derived by employing a new mathematical technique, which can be regarded as
the generalization of the lattice theoretical comparative statics.
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1 Introduction
In the standard consumer theory, the consumer has the preference on the set of commodities
and he/she maximizes his/her preference subject to the linear budget constraint. Numerous
studies along these lines have been conducted, and at least theoretically, various robust and
sophisticated results have been revealed. However, as Lancaster (1966) points out, the standard
theory has the only one answer to the following questions, \It is because of the tastes of the
consumer."
\Why does the consumer choose to consume a particular good?"
\Why is some pro¯le of goods prefered to the other ?"
\Why (or why not) is a good a close substitute for the other?".
That is because the conventional theory omits the intrinsic properties of goods and those of
the consumer's preference.
Lancaster (1966) proposes an alternative approach to construct the consumer theory that
includes these properties. Here, each pro¯le of commodities is regarded as a pro¯le of the char-
acteristics that a®ect the well-being of the consumer, and preference is de¯ned on the set of
these characteristics. The characteristics are derived by consuming commodities, and hence, ex-
isting variations of commodities constitute the \physical constraint" for the consumer's choice.
The price system of characteristics, which constitutes the \budget constraint" is derived from
the relationship between the characteristics and commodities, and the price system of existing
commodities. Therefore, in this theory, the consumer chooses the pro¯le of characteristics that
maximizes his/her preference subject to the budget constraint and the physical constraint. The
solution set of the consumer's problem can be regarded as the \demand for characteristics,"
which can be translated into the demand for commodities by considering the relationship be-
tween commodities and characteristics. By employing this theory, we may answer the preceding
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questions along the lines of the following examples:
\A meal is consumed because it possesses nutritional characteristics that are essential for the
consumer's life."
\Chocolates packed in an ornamental box are prefered to those packed in a plain cardboard
box because the former provides the consumer with higher quality in appearance, while both
possess the same level of taste and nutrition."
\A glass of Japanese whisky is a close substitute for a glass of Scotch whisky because these
two goods share many characteristics."
However, it should be emphasized that this theory serves not only for providing the consumer
theory with the heuristic basis but also for extending a more practical aspect of demand anal-
yses. Speci¯cally, as Lancaster states, it enables us to investigate or predict the consumer's
demand for the goods or quality variations that have not yet emerged. Evidently, introducing
new commodities is equal to altering the budget constraint and the physical constraint, and
hence, the preference need not be modi¯ed. On the other hand, it is obvious that the standard
theory cannot address such an analysis because the preference itself must be de¯ned on the set
of existing goods.
The idea of regarding a pro¯le of commodities as a pro¯le of characteristics has been suc-
cessfully employed in the literature of the hedonic price studies initiated by Rosen (1974) and
in its application in studies such as Palmquist (1984), which analyzes the housing demand
by regarding a dwelling as a pro¯le of relevant characterisitics. From the theoretical perspec-
tive, comparative statics analysis through this approach has been interested. Needless to say,
comparative statics is an important topic in consumer theory since most of the empirical pre-
dictions of the consumer's behavior in response to the changes of some exogeneous parameters
are derived from it. In addition, according to the statements in the previous paragraph, com-
3
parative statics of characteristic demand enables us to predict the properties of the demand
for new commodities, which is beyond the scope of standard consumer theory. The possible
mathematical reasons behind the di±culty in constructing the theory on comparative statics
for characteristic demand are presented as follows. First, if we de¯nes the budget constraint on
the set of characteristics, we must deal with the nonlinear constraint explicitly. Second, when
considering the set of characteristics, we cannot expect that it is the Euclidean space, although
most of researchers, including Lancaster and Rosen, implicitly regard it as the Euclidean space.
This makes it di±cult to justify the assumption of the smoothness and convexity of the prefer-
ences. With regard to the ¯rst aspect, in spite of Rosen's pessimistic prediction (Rosen (1974,
p.59)), Edlefsen (1981) proposes a theory of comparative statics under nonlinear constraints.
However, his theory depends on monotonicity and quasiconcavity of a utility function, twice
continuous di®erentiablity of a utility function and constraints, and existence of an interior
solution. Hence, the second aspect remains an open issue.
In this paper, we overcome the above di±culities by employing order theoretical compar-
ative statics, which is often applied in recent economic theory, and investigate the condition
for monotone comparative statics of characteristic demand, particularly, the monotonicity of
income e®ects. The basis for constructing comparative statics is the \value order" method
developed by Antoniadou (2007), Mirman and Ruble (2008), and Antoniadou et al. (2009).
These studies discuss the monotone comparative statics of the consumer's demand along the
lines of the standard consumer theory12. A brief description of the value order approach is as
follows. First, some partial order that is suitable for comparative statics, the \value order," is
de¯ned on the consumption set (in this paper, the set of characteristics). Then, using this par-
1Nevertheless, Antoniadou et al. (2009) deal with the demand for lottery and provide the su±cient condition
for the monotonicity of lottery demand in terms of the \quality" or the \characteristic" of the lottery like the ¯rst
(second) order stochastic domination. In this sense, theoretically, our study can be regarded as an extension of their
study.
2Quah (2007) presents another approach for order theoretical comparative statics of the consumer's demand. He
dexterously shows the su±cient condition for monotone comparative statics by employing concavity and supermod-
ularity of a utility function in the Euclidean space; which can be regarded as the generalization of Chipman (1977).
However, in his approach, it is essential that the consumption set is a convex sublattice of Rn.
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tial order, lattice theoretical comparative statics by Milgrom and Shannon (1994), and LiCalzi
and Veinott (2005) is applied. Hence, the property called \quasisupermodularity" of a utility
function with respect to the value order constitutes one of the su±cient conditions for mono-
tone comparative statics. However, in this study, we do not employ lattice programming itself
but generalized monotone comparative statics developed by Shirai (2008)3. Although both the
theories have fairly similar structures, the latter can be applied as long as some appropriate
preorder is de¯ned on the consumption set, while the former requires the consumption set to
be a partially ordered set, more speci¯cally, a lattice. In our general setting, it is di±cult
to construct an appropriate partial order. In particular, antisymmetry is quite di±cult to be
satis¯ed. Therefore, we employ new mathematical technique in this paper. As a result, we
extend the value order method to the preordered sets and provide the su±cient condition for
monotone comparative statics of the characteristic demand. Our requirement for the set of
characteristics is that it should be written as the direct product of the set of each characteris-
tic. Hence, we can allow the existence of characteristics that have only ¯nite alternatives and
those that cannot be expressed in terms of quantitative measure. Although we assume that the
preference can be represented by a utility function, with regard to the minimum requirements
for the domain of a utility function, di®erentiability, quasiconcavity, and similar regularity
conditions in the standard consumer theory are not assumed. In addition, we do not impose
concavity (convexity) assumptions on the price systems, although monotonicity and a weak
form of continuity in the level of (at least) one characteristic is required.
While our su±cient condition on a utility function possesses high generality, it is inevitable
that the more general the domain of a utility function is, the more opaque is the economic
implication of the condition for a utility function. In this case, we must pay attention to
the veri¯ablity of the su±cient condition. We can characterize the su±cient condition for a
utility function in terms of the welfare variations for the change in a characteristic; this can
3See also Shirai (2009), which is a correction of Shirai (2008).
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be checked easily, as compared to the conditions on a direct utility function. In the literature
of environmental economics, it is well known that the compensating variation, that is, the
willingness to pay (WTP) for the change in an environmental quality can be estimated through
the contingent valuation method, and that the monotonicity of WTP in income levels implies
the necessary and su±cient condition for the normal demand, under the assumption of a unique
solution and some regularity conditions (See McConnell (1990) and Whitehead (1995).). By
applying our su±cient condition for a utility function we can extend this result to the context
of characteristic demand without imposing regularity conditions such as di®erentiablity and
strict quasiconcavity of a utility function, that are assumed in conventional WTP studies.
Since the di®erentiability of a utility function in environmental qualities seems to be a rather
technical assumption, in this sense, our results play a role of checking the robustness of the
conventional WTP analysis. More precisely, we can interpret the above argument as a special
case of the relationship between the su±cient condition based on the value order approach
and the properties of welfare variations; this indicates the advantage of using the value order
method.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, our mathematical technique,
that is, generalized monotone comparative statics based on Shirai (2008) is presented. Then,
in Section 3.1, the formal de¯nition of the consumer's problem in this study is de¯ned. In
Section 3.2, by applying the mathematics used in Section 2, the su±cient condition for mono-
tone comparative statics is shown. The examples indicate that our formulation of the utility
maximization problem, and hence our theory of comparative statics can encompass a wide
range of consumer problems in economics, including the standard consumer theory. In Section
4, the su±cient condition for monotone comparative statics is characterized in terms of welfare
variations. In Section 4.1, the general relationship between our su±cient condition and the
properties of the welfare variations is investigated. In Section 4.2, by restricting the form of
the price system, the relationship between our results and those of McConnell and Whitehead
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is explored.
2 Mathematical Backgrounds
In this section, we present our main mathematical technique to perform comparative statics
analysis, as shown by Shirai (2008). It can be regarded as the generalization of the lattice
theoretical comparative statics by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and LiCalzi and Veinott (2005)
in that it is equivalent to the conventional results when those can be applied. In the light of
the mathematical structure of the comparative statics of consumer's problem, it seems natural
to focus on comparative statics of the solution set of the maximization problem with respect to
the changes of feasible sets4. Formally, the problem that we address can be written as follows.
Let X be the domain of the objective function f : X ! R, that is, the whole set of alternatives,
and let S ½ X be a feasible set. Now, consider the maximization problem
max
x2S½X
f(x):
Let M(S) denote the solution set of the above problem when the feasible set is S. We intend
to analyze the e®ects of the change of the feasible set from S to S0 on M(¢). Speci¯cally, in
this study, monotone comparative statics forms the core of the analysis in this paper.
To facilitate the understanding of our technique, we ¯rst review the essence of the standard
lattice theoretical comparative statics. The most fundamental requirement to employ the
theory is that the domain of the objective function X is a partially ordered set with special
properties; which is refered to as a \lattice."
De¯nition 1: Let ·X be a partial order on X. (X;·X) is a lattice if the in¯mum and the
4Milgrom and Shannon (1994) also consider the comparative statics with respect to the changes of objective
functions.
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supremum of every two elements in X exist. That is, (X;·X) is a lattice if both x^y = supfz j
z ·X x & z ·X yg and x _ y = inffz j x ·X z & y ·X zg exist in X.
As can be presumed from what we are addressing, the partial order ·X is the basis for
the comparative criterion. That is, the comparative criterion that gauges the \changes," more
speci¯cally, the \monotonic changes," of feasible sets and the solution sets of maximization
problems, is constructed from ·X .
De¯nition 2: Let (X;·X) be a lattice and S; S0 ½ X. We say that S is lower than S0 with
respect to the strong set order, if x ^ y 2 S and x _ y 2 S0 for every x 2 S and y 2 S0. We
denote this as S ·a S0.
Note that, in general, ·a is not re°exible. To derive re°exibility, a restriction should be
imposed on S, which is stated as follows.
De¯nition 3: Let (X;·X) be a lattice. S ½ X is said to be a sublattice of X if (S;·X) is a
lattice.
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and LiCalzi and Veinott (2005) demonstrate that monotone
comparative statics in terms of the strong set order is ensured if and only if the objective
function f : X ! R satis¯es the following condition.
De¯nition 4: Let (X;·X) be a lattice and f : X ! R. We say that f is quasisupermodular5
5LiCalzi and Veinott use the term lattice super extremum to refer to the same property. It should be noted that
they also provide the necessary and su±cient condition for monotone comparative statics with respect to comparative
criteria that are di®erent from the strong set order.
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if
f(x) ¸ (>)f(x ^ y)) f(x _ y) ¸ (>)f(y):
Theorem 5 (Milgrom and Shannon, LiCalzi and Veinott): Let X be a lattice and S; S0 ½ X.
M(S) ·a M(S0) for every S ·a S0 if and only if the objective function f satis¯es quasisuper-
modularity. In addition, if S is a sublattice of X, then M(S) is also a sublattice.
Proof See Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Theorem 4.
The construction of the preceding de¯nitions and theorem clearly shows that to employ
lattice theoretical comparative statics, it is essential that the domain of the objective function
is a lattice, speci¯cally, a partially ordered set. However, as stated in the previous section, under
our general settings, it is di±cult to de¯ne an appropriate partial order on the consumption
set; Moreover, even if it was possible, the su±cient condition derived through Theorem 5 tends
to be so restrictive that it has few economic implications. Hence, in this study, we employ
generalized monotone comparative statics, which can be applied as long as an appropriate
preorder is de¯ned on the domain of the objective function. The following de¯nitions imply
that the concept of this theory is similar to the conventional lattice programming. The rest of
this subsection is based on Shirai (2008). First, we de¯ne a preordered set with \lattice-like"
properties, which is called a \preordered lattice structure."
De¯nition 6: Let (X;4X) be a preordered set. We say that X is a preordered lattice structure
if Tx;y 6= ; and Ax;y 6= ;, where Tx;y and Ax;y is the set of the greatest lower bounds and that
of the least upper bounds in X respectively.
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Note that if (X;4X) is a partially ordered set, then a preordered lattice structure is a
lattice. In this sense, it is an extension of the concept of a lattice. An important aspect to be
noted is that both the greatest lower bounds and the least upper bounds with respect to the
order on X exist. Similar to the above case, we extend the notions of the strong set order and
quasisupermodularity to the preordered lattice structure. If 4X is a partial order, then each
of the extended notions is equivalent with the corresponding notion in the standard lattice
programming.
De¯nition 7: Let (X;4X) be a preordered lattice structure and S; S0 ½ X. We say that S
is lower than S0 in terms of the w-strong set order if Tx;y \ S 6= ; and Ax;y \ S0 6= ; for every
x 2 S and y 2 S0. We denote this as S ·wa S0. We say that S is lower than S0 in terms of the
s-strong set order if Tx;y ½ S and Ax;y ½ S0 for every x 2 S and y 2 S0.
De¯nition 8: Let (X;4X) be a preordered lattice structure and f : X ! R. We say that f
is w-quasisupermodular if
8t 2 Tx;y; f(x) ¸ (>)f(t)) 9a 2 Ax;y; f(a) ¸ (>)f(y)
for every x; y 2 X.
Note that both the w-strong set order and the s-strong set order do not satisfy re°exibility;
this is similar to the case with the strong set order. To derive re°exibility, we de¯ne the
counterparts of the concept of a sublattice.
De¯nition 9: Let (X;4X) be a preordered lattice structure. S ½ X is said to be a w-sublattice
of X if Tx;y \ S 6= ; and Ax;y \ S 6= ; for every x; y 2 S. S ½ X is said to be an s-sublattice if
Tx;y ½ S and Ax;y ½ S for every x; y 2 S.
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Note that both Tx;y and Ax;y are taken with respect to 4X . S ·wa S if and only if S is
a w-sublattice. The case with an s-sublattice is similar. Thus, we can extend Theorem 5 as
follows.
Theorem 10: Let (X;4) be a preordered lattice structure and f : X ! R. Let M(S) be the
solution set of the maximization problem
max
x2S½X
f(x):
For every S ·sa S0, M(S) ·wa M(S0) if and only if f is w-quasisupermodular. In addition, if
S is an s-sublattice, then M(S) is a w-sublattice.
Proof First, we demonstrate the su±ciency. Let x 2 M(S) and y 2 M(S0). Since S ·sa S0,
Tx;y ½ S and Ax;y ½ S0. By de¯nition, f(x) ¸ f(t) for all t 2 Tx;y. Hence, by the w-
quasisupermodularity of f , there exists a 2 Ax;y such that f(a) ¸ f(y); this implies that
Ax;y \M(S0) 6= ;. Similarly, Tx;y \M(S) 6= ;. Otherwise, by the w-quasisupermodularity of
f , there exists a 2 Ax;y such that f(a) > f(y); this contradicts y 2M(S0).
Then, we show the necessity. Fix x; y 2 X and let S = fxg [ Tx;y and S0 = fyg [ Ax;y
for x; y 2 X. Obviously, S ·sa S0. Suppose that f(x) ¸ f(t) for all t 2 Tx;y. Then,
x 2 M(S). Since M(S) ·wa M(S0), there exists a 2 Ax;y such that a 2 M(S0); this implies
that f(a) ¸ f(y). Suppose that f(x) > f(t) for every Tx;y and y 2 M(S0). Then, there exists
t 2 Tx;y such that t 2 M(S); this contradicts the assumption. Hence, there exists a 2 Ax;y
such that f(a) > f(y).
Suppose that S is an s-sublattice. Let x; y 2 M(S). Since S ·sa S, by the result of the
¯rst paragraph of this proof, M(S) ·wa M(S). [Q.E.D.]
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3 Canonical Results
In this section, we de¯ne the problem that we address in this paper and show the su±cent
condition for monotone comparative statics of the consumer's demand. The formal de¯nition
of the consumer's problem is provided in the ¯rst subsection. In accordance with Lancaster
(1966), a utility function of the consumer is de¯ned on the set of characteristics or attributes
that a®ect the well-being of the consumer. These characteristics are supposed to be derived by
consuming the commodities, and hence, we consider the relationship between characteristics
and commodities. In the second subsection, we proceed to comparative statics analysis by
employing the mathematics that was used in the previous section. Our idea of monotone
comparative statics is based on the \value-order" method developed by Antoniadou (2007)
and Mirman and Ruble (2008). Further, we show that this approach can address a wide range
of consumer's problems.
3.1 Model
In this subsection, we de¯ne the problem faced by the consumer. As stated at the start of
this section, the preference of the consumer is de¯ned on the set of attributes or characteristics
derived through the consumption of commodities. Formally, let X = X1 £ X2 £ ::: £ Xn be
the set of characteristics, where every Xk is a set. For each pro¯le of characteristics x =
(x1; x2; :::; xn) 2 X, the value of it is determined by a function p : X ! R [ f+1g, which is
referred to as a price system in the rest of this paper. We assume that the preference of the
consumer is represented by a utility function U : X ! R. Then, given a price system p(¢) and
an income level w > 0, the budget set of the consumer is B(p; w) = fx 2 X j p(x) · wg, and
the utility maximization problem is
max
x2B(p;w)
U(x):
Let D(p; w) denote the solution set of this problem. To ensure the existence of the solution, we
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may assume the compactness of B(p; w) and upper semi-continuity of U with respect to some
adequate topology. However, as far as comparative statics analysis, a topological property is
not employed, and hence, the nonemptyness of D(p; w) is directly assumed in the rest of this
paper.
The commodities are taken into the above setting as follows. LetM be the set of variations
of commodities, and let Y ½ RM+ be a subset of the set of all nonnegative real-valued functions
on M. For instance, if M = f1; 2; :::;mg, then Y can be written as a subset of Rm+ . We
regard Y as a consumption set in terms of commodities. Note that we do not impose convexity
on Y , and hence, the existence of indivisible commodities is allowed. De¯ne the set-valued
function G : Y ! 2X such that G(y) ½ X represents the pro¯les of characteristics that are
attainable from the pro¯le of goods y 2 Y and let G¡1(x) = fy 2 Y j x 2 G(y)g. This is
the generalization of the formulation in Lancaster (1966), where the relationship between the
characteristics and the commodities is depicted by the linear transformation. In general, each
pro¯le of commodities y can generate more than one pro¯le of characteristics. This seems
plausible if one assumes the \free disposal of characteristics," which is formally stated later.
On the set G(Y ) ½ X, we de¯ne the price system of characteristics p(x) as the value function
of the minimization problem
min
y2G¡1(x)
q(y);
where q : Y ! R denotes the price system of commodities. If Y ½ Rm+ and the price of each
commodity is separable and linear, q(y) = q1y1 + q2y2 + :::+ qmym. For x =2 G(Y ), we suppose
that p(x) = +1, which de¯nes the physical constraint for the choice of the pro¯le of character-
istics. Thus, intuitively, p(x) represents the minimal cost to enjoy the pro¯le of characteristics
x. Let ¡(q; x) denote the solution set of the preceding minimization problem. If x¤ 2 D(p; w),
the set ¡(q; x¤) is the demand for commodities corresponding to x¤. Thus, the demand for
commodities corresponding to D(p; w) is equal to [x¤2D(p;w)¡(q; x¤) = ¡(q;D(p; w)). In the
above argument, the mapping G, and hence, p(¢), could be di®erent among consumers since
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they would re°ect each consumer's characteristics.
Note that this model can encompass the standard consumer's problem by letting X = Y
and G be the identical mapping. In this sense, our setting can be seen as the generalization of
the standard consumer theory. Moreover, our formulation of the utility maximization problem
enables us to analyze the consumer's demand for the commodities that are not present in the
market, such as new commodities. The appearance of new commodities causes the change of the
feasible set of consumer. LetM0 be the altered set of variations of commodities and Y 0 ½ RM0+ .
De¯ne G0 : Y 0 ! 2X as the set of pro¯les of characteristics that are attainable by y 2 Y 0 and
G0¡1 : X ! 2Y 0 such that G0¡1(x) = fy 2 Y 0 j x 2 G0(y)g. De¯ne p0 : X ! R [ f+1g as the
value function of the minimization problem
min
y2G0¡1(x)
q0(y);
where q0(¢) is a price system of commodities de¯ned on Y 0. Then, the demand for characteris-
tics D(p0; w) is derived and, similar to the previous paragraph, it can be transformed into the
demand for commodities, [x¤2D(p0;w)¡(q0; x¤). Intuitively, one can predict the demand for new
commodities as long as their \properties" of them are known. This extension is impossible in
the standard consumer theory. Indeed, in the conventional theory, a utility function or the
preference of the consumer is de¯ned on the set of existing commodities, say, Y , and hence, it
is impossible to predict the reaction of the consumer to the new commodities.
Example 11: Consider the simple case in which there exist only two characteristics, the air-
conditioning capacity, X1, and the composite characteristic that represents all other character-
istics in the economy, X2. Then, a utility function is U : X ! R, where X = X1£X2. Suppose
that the characteristic of air-conditioning capacity is shared by only two commodities, for exam-
ple, an electric fan (EF) and an air-conditioner (AC) and that the level of composite character-
istic is equal to the consumption level of the num¶eraire composite good yc 2 R+ (= X2). Then,
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the set of variations of commodities is M = fEF;AC;COMg, where COM denotes the com-
posite good. For simplicity, we assume that the possible choice for the consumer with regard to
the air-conditioning equipments is \to buy or not to buy" each commodity. That is, the set of
possible pro¯les of commodities can be written as Y = f0; 1g£f0; 1g£R+. On the other hand, in
terms of the characteristic of air-conditioning, the consumer can choose (1) no air-conditioning
equipment (;), (2) one unit of the electric fan (EF ), (3) one unit of the air-conditioner (AC),
and (4) one unit of the electric fan and the air-conditioner each (EF [AC). Hence, the set of
possible pro¯les of characteristics can be written as G(Y ) = f;; EF;AC;EF [ACg£R+ ½ X.
De¯ne the linear order6 ·1 on X1, which represents the level of the air-conditioning capacity.
Assume that ; <1 EF <1 AC <1 EF [AC and free disposal of this characteristic is possible,
that is, the level EF can be achieved by AC and EF [AC. The price system of characteristics
p : X ! R can be constructed as follows. Let qe and qa be the unit price of EF and AC
respectively. Suppose that qe < qa. For each yc 2 R+, the price system can be de¯ned such
that
p(;; yc) = yc
p(EF; yc) = qe + yc
p(AC; yc) = qa + yc
p(EF [AC; yc) = qe + qa + yc:
For x 2 X n G(Y ), de¯ne p(x) = +1.
Then, we consider introducing a new commodity, in particular, a new type of air-conditioning
equipment (NAC). If we preserve the assumption of binary choice, the new set of pro¯les of com-
modities is Y 0 = f0; 1g£f0; 1g£f0; 1g£R+. The new set of possible pro¯les of characteristics
is G0(Y 0) = f;; EF;AC;NAC;EF [AC;EF [NAC;AC[NAC;EF [AC[NACg£R+ ½ X.
6A binary relation is said to be a linear order or total order if it satis¯es re°exibility, anti-symmetry, transitivity,
and completeness.
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Let qn denote the unit price of NAC, and suppose that qe + qa < qn. Assume that
; <1 EF <1 AC <1 (EF [AC) <1 NAC <1
(EF [NAC) <1 (AC [NAC) <1 (EF [AC [NAC):
Then, the new price system p0 can be de¯ned such that, for each yc 2 R+,
p0(;; yc) = yc
p0(EF; yc) = qe + yc
p0(AC; yc) = qa + yc
p0(EF [AC; yc) = qe + qa + yc
p0(NAC; yc) = qn + yc
p0(EF [NAC; yc) = qe + qn + yc
p0(AC [NAC; yc) = qa + qn + yc
p0(EF [AC [NAC; yc) = qe + qa + qn + yc:
Similar to the case with p, de¯ne p0(x) = +1 for x 2 X n G(Y 0). Thus, even when a new
commodity is introduced, the same utility function that was employed ealier can be used. In
this case, the new price system p0(¢) is de¯ned such that p0(x) = p(x), if p(x) < +1, although
it need not be satis¯ed in general.
3.2 Comparative Statics
Now, we proceed to comparative statics of the demand for characteristics in our setting.
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In particular, we are interested in the su±cient condition under which the demand for char-
acteristic j is monotone \nondecreasing" in income levels. Monotone comparative statics of
the demand for commodities is investigated by using the results on the characteristic demand.
Since the set of characteristic j, Xj is not necessarily a priori ordered, to make the notion
of \nondecreasing" be well-de¯ned, we must de¯ne some criterion ·j that gauges the level of
characteristic j. This is the generalization of ·1 in Example 11. In this study, we assume that
the comparative criterion ·j on Xj is a linear order on Xj and that it satis¯es the following
assumption.
Assumption 12: The comparative criterion ·j is \value-increasing," that is, if p(x¡j ; xj) <
+1, p(x¡j ; xj) < p(x¡j ; x0j) for every x¡j 2 £k 6=jXk and xj <j x0j . If p(x¡j ; xj) = +1, then
p(x¡j ; x0j) = +1 for xj <j x0j .
Note that Assumption 12 implicitly requires the possibility of \free disposal of character-
istic j." Formally, free disposal of characterstic j means that if (x¡j ; x0j) can be achieved by
consuming a pro¯le of goods y, then (x¡j ; xj) is also attainable by y for every xj ·j x0j . If the
assumption of free disposal fails to be satis¯ed, de¯ning p(x) = +1 for every x =2 G(Y ) may
violate the preceding assumption. However, note that the assumption of free disposal does not
necessarily imply the binding budget constraint. For instance, consider the case with discrete
choice.
Since we do not assume the uniqueness of demand, the notion of \monotonicity" of the
demand must be de¯ned explicitly. Although there exist several notions of monotonicity7, we
adopt the following.
De¯nition 13: Given a price system p(¢), the demand for characteristic j is pathwisely normal
7As an example, see Antoniadou (2007).
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with respect to ·j if, for every x 2 D(p; w), there exists x0 2 D(p; w0) such that xj ·j x0j and,
for every x0 2 D(p; w0), there exists x 2 D(p; w) such that xj ·j x0j for every w < w0.
In the rest of this section, by applying the mathematical technique stated in the previous
section, we show the su±cient condition for the demand for characteristic j to be \normal" in
the above sense. First, we impose the following assumption on the price systems of characteris-
tics. Note that the condition is satis¯ed, for example, if there exists at least one characteristic
k (k 6= j) whose levels can be written as real numbers and a price system that is a continuous
function in that characteristic.
Assumption 14: For every ® 2 R, if p(x¡j ; xj) < ®, then there exists some x¡j(®) such that
p(x¡j(®); xj) = ®.
As already mentioned, our mathematical technique requires that some appropriate preorder
is de¯ned on the domain of the objective function. Under Assumptions 12 and 14, we can adopt
the following.
De¯nition 15: De¯ne 4(p;·j) on X such that x 4(p;·j) x0 if xj ·j x0j and p(x) · p(x0). We
refer to this as the (p;·j)-value order. If xj ·j x0j and both p(x) = +1 and p(x0) = +1, then
we de¯ne that x 4(p;·j) x0.
This is the generalization of the notions of the \value orders" in Antoniadou (2007), Mirman
and Ruble (2008), and Antoniadou et al. (2009) that are de¯ned as partial orders. More
precisely, our value order is the generalization of the \direct value order" in Antoniadou (2007).
She de¯nes it as a preorder on Rn+; however, in her analyses, she restricts the consumption set
to R2+ so that the direct value order satis¯es antisymmetry. In addition to the direct value
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order, Mirman and Ruble (2008) introduce other value orders such as the \radial value order"
and the \iterated value order"; in Antoniadou et al. (2009), the value orders that are bene¯cial
for analyzing the lottery demands are de¯ned. Note that it is common for every value order
that it encompasses the comparative criterion and the value of the consumption bundles. It
should be mentioned that, in our model, de¯ning the appropriate partial order, particularly
with regard to ensuring anti-symmetry, is quite di±cult. Although, as long as X = Rn+, the
iterated value order can be employed even when there exist more than two characteristics, the
su±cient condition for normality based on that order is more restrictive in our setting; this
is referred to later. The results in the next section also indicate the advantage of using the
(p;·j)-value order.
To con¯rm that the (p;·j)-value order is suitable for our purpose, it must be shown that
(1) the domain of a utility function, the set of characteristics, is a preordered lattice structure
with respect to the (p;·j)-value order, (2) the budget set is s-strong set comparable, and (3)
the w-strong set comparability of the demand set implies the pathwise normality of the demand
for characteritic j with respect to ·j . In our case, these properties are satis¯ed, as exlained
below.
Proposition 16: Fix a price system p(¢). Then, under Assumptions 12 and 14, (X;4(p;·j))
is a preordered lattice structure.
Proof Let x and x0 be two incomparable points in X, with xj >j x0j and p(x) < p(x
0).
Then, de¯ne xtj such that x
t
j = x
0
j . By Assumption 12, p(x¡j ; x
t
j) < p(x¡j ; xj). Then, by
Assumption 14, there exists xt¡j such that p(x
t
¡j ; x
t
j) = p(x¡j ; xj). Obviously, this x
t =
(xt¡j ; x
t
j) is an element of Tx:x0 . Similarly, de¯ne x
a
j such that x
a
j = xj . If p(x
0) < +1, since
p(x) = p(x¡j ; xaj ) < p(x
0
¡j ; x
0
j) = p(x
0), there exists xa¡j such that p(x
a
¡j ; x
a
j ) = p(x
0
¡j ; x
0
j) by
Assumption 14. This xa = (xa¡j ; x
a
j ) is an element of Ax;x0 . If p(x
0) = +1, by Assumption 12,
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xa = (x0¡j ; xj) is also unattainable and it is an element of Ax;x0 . [Q.E.D.]
Proposition 17: Fix a price system p(¢). Then, for every w < w0, the budget sets are s-strong
set comparable, that is, B(p; w) ·sa B(p; w0). In addition, for every w, the budget set is an
s-sublattice of X.
Proof Let x 2 B(p; w) and x0 2 B(p; w0). Suppose that xj >j x0j and p(x) < p(x0). However,
for every element xt 2 Tx;x0 , we have p(xt) = p(x) · w, which implies that Tx;x0 ½ B(p; w).
Similarly, Ax;x0 ½ B(p; w0).
Let x; x0 2 B(p; w) with xj >j x0j and p(x) < p(x0). However, for every xt 2 Tx;x0 ,
p(xt) = p(x) · w, and for every xa 2 Ax;x0 , p(xa) = p(x0) · w. [Q.E.D.]
Proposition 18: Fix a price system p(¢). Then, under Assumptions 12 and 14, for every
w < w0, D(p; w) ·wa D(p; w0) implies that the demand for characteristic j is pathwisely normal
with respect to ·j.
Proof Let x 2 D(p; w) and x0 2 D(p; w0). Without loss of generality, we can suppose that
xj >j x
0
j . By w-strong set comparability, there exists x
t 2 D(p; w) \ Tx;x0 . By de¯nition of
Tx;x0 , xtj = x
0
j . Similarly, there exists x
a 2 D(p; w0) \ Ax;x0 and xaj = xj , which completes the
proof. [Q.E.D.]
Then, by applying Theorem 10, we have the following.
Proposition 19: Fix a price system p(¢). Then, under Assumptions 12 and 14, the demand
for characteristic j is pathwisely normal if a utility function U satis¯es w-quasisupermodularity
with respect to the (p;·j)-value order. In addition, D(p; w) is a w-sublattice of the consumption
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set X for every w > 0.
Remark: In Mirman and Ruble (2008), as the generalization of the direct value order, the
iterated value order is de¯ned as follows. Let X = Rn+ and p(x) = p1x1 + p2x2 + ::: + pnxn,
where every pk ¸ 0. The iterated value order ·(p;iv) is de¯ned such that for every x; x0 2 X,
x ·(p;iv) x0 if p1x1 · p1x01, p1x1 + p2x2 · p1x01 + p2x02,..., and
Pn
k=1 pkxk ·
Pn
k=1 pkx
0
k. It is
shown that (X;·(p;iv)) is a lattice and if a utility function U satis¯es quasisupermodularity with
respect to this order, the demand for x1 is pathwisely normal. However, this su±cient condition
depends on the numbering of coordinates and more restrictive than w-quasisupermodularity
with respect to 4(p;·1). Indeed, it can be con¯rmed from the fact that for every x; x0 2 X, the
in¯mum and the supremum with respect to ·(p;iv) are elements of Tx;x0 and Ax;x0 with respect
to 4(p;·1) respectively.
It should be noted that our su±cient condition does not require the regularity conditions
that are usually assumed in the standard consumer theory. This is one of the advantages of the
value order approach. The set of characteristics is not restricted to the Euclidean space; the
price system is allowed to be nonlinear; a utility function is not assumed to be di®erentiable; the
set valued demand is allowed; and the non-binding budget constraint is also allowed. Even in a
simple model like Example 11, at least, the di®erentiable utility function is impossible to justify
because of the discrete choice assumption. Although the condition \w-quasisupermodularity
with respect to the (p;·j)-value order" might seems to be opaque, in the next section, we
show that the su±cient condition here can be characterized by the properties of the welfare
variations that have transparent economic implications.
Example 11 (continued): In light of Proposition 19, given a price system p(¢), the demand
for the air-conditioning capacity is pathwisely normal if a utility function U : X ! R satis¯es
21
w-quasisupermodularity with respect to the (p;·1)-value order. Recall that we assume that
; <1 EF <1 AC <1 EF [ AC. If the demand for the air-conditioning capacity is normal, we
may observe that the demand for the air-conditioning commodities changes from EF to AC,
when the income level increases. Then, we can conclude that EF is an inferior good, which
is correct. However, what is the reason bihind this phenomenon? According to the standard
textbook of microeconomics, we may say that \EF is an inferior good because of the existence of
a substitute with higher quality, AC"8. However, this interpretation seems inappropriate when
we observes that a further increase in the income level leads to the shift from AC to EF [AC.
In this situation, EF and AC can rather be regarded as complements. In addition, the term
\substitute" and \complement" here indicate the intrinsic properties of goods that cannot be
derived from the standard consumer theory. On the other hand, by using comparative statics
of characteristic demand, we can make a well-de¯ned interpretation such that \the demand
shifts from EF to AC because the demand for the air-conditioning capacity is normal and AC
provides the consumer with a higher level of that characteristic than EF," for instance.
From the above example, it is clear that comparative statics of characteristic demand also
provides a rigorous interpretation for the income e®ects of the demand for commodities. In-
deed, by extending the discussion in the previous example, we can show the su±cient condition
under which the income e®ect of the demand for a particular commodity is nonnegative. An
important point to be noted is that, by using the set-valued functions G and ¡, the demand for
characteristics can be transformed into the demand for commodities. In the following state-
ment, the normality of the demand for commodities can be de¯ned in a similar manner that
for the normality of the demand for characteristics.
Proposition 20: For every x; x0 2 X, xj ·j x0j, and maxfp(x); p(x0)g < +1, assume the
8Such statements can be found, for example, in Kreps (1990, p.49).
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following:
For every y 2 ¡(q; x), there exists y0 2 ¡(q; x0) such that y(k) · y0(k), and for every y0 2
¡(q; x0), there exists y 2 ¡(q; x) such that y(k) · y0(k).
Then, if the demand for characteristic j is pathwisely normal, then the demand for commodity
k is also pathwisely normal.
Proof Let w < w0 and y 2 ¡ (q;D(p; w)). Since the demand for characteristic j is path-
wisely normal, for every x 2 D(p; w), there exists x0 2 D(p; w0) such that xj ·j x0j . By the
assumption in the statement, there exists y0 2 ¡(q; x0) such that y(k) · y0(k). Obviously,
y0 2 ¡ (q;D(p; w0)). Similarly, it can be shown that, for every y0 2 ¡ (D(p; w0)), there exists
y 2 ¡ (q;D(p; w)) such that y(k) · y0(k0). [Q.E.D.]
Intuitively, the condition in the preceding proposition implies that a higher number of
commodity k enables the consumer e®eciently to acquire a higher level of characteristic j. In
Example 11, AC trivially satis¯es this condition since AC is essential to achieve the level of
air-conditioning capacity that is higher than EF . According to our assumptions, if the new
commodity, NAC, is introduced, we can predict that it will be a normal good, while AC will not
be a normal good. The relationship between EF and AC (and NAC) in Example 11 also implies
that the \substitutes" and \complements" in terms of intrinsic properties of commodities might
be compatible. A commodity may be a close \substitute" of the other if these two goods share
various characteristics. However, it is possible that these goods are \complements" with each
other if the joint consumption leads to a high level or quality in terms of some characteristics9.
Although we do not pursue this point in this paper, it might be an interesting topic for future
9In this sense, intrinsic complementarity seems to have the close relationship with monotonicity. Chambers and
Echenique (2009) show the closeness between complementarity and monotonicity, from the mathematical viewpoint,.
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research.
Befere proceeding to the next section, we provide some examples to con¯rm that our expres-
sion of the utility maximization problem, and hence our comparative statics, can encompass a
wide range of models.
Example 21: Let X = Rn+ and let the price system be linear. Then, p(x1; :::; xn) =
p1x1 + ::: + pnxn, which is the model of the standard consumer theory. This can be regarded
as a special case of our setting in which it is supposed that each consumption good possesses
peculiar and independent characteristics. In this example, each element in Xj denotes the
amount of consumption good j. If one intends to perform the quantitative comparative statics
of the demand for good j, the comparative criterion ·j is the Euclidean order. The (p;·j)-
value order 4(p;·j) is de¯ned such that x 4(p;·j) x0 if xj ·j x0j and p ¢ x · p ¢ x0. The same
de¯nition is used for the direct value order in Antoniadou (2007). By Proposition 19, if a utility
function U satis¯es w-quasisupermodularity with respect to this order, the demand for good
j is pathwisely normal. Note that, if n = 2, the direct value order is the partial order and
standard lattice programming can be applied. Note that this argument can be applied even if
there exist some indivisible commodities, as long as Assumptions 12 and 14 are satis¯ed.
Example 22: Consider the housing demand problem in Palmquist (1984). In this case, the
consumer is supposed to purchase the num¶eraire composite good x0 2 R+ and a dwelling. A
dwelling is characterized as a pro¯le of various characteristics (x1; :::; xn) 2 £nk=1Xk. Typically,
the price of a dwelling is determined by a nonlinear function pd(x1; :::; xn), that is, a price sys-
tem is written as p(x) = x0 + pd(x1; :::; xn). The consumer's utility is supposed to depend on
the quantity of the composite good and the characteristics of the dwelling he/she purchases.
This is similar to the setting in Example 11. However, in this case, it is supposed that a single
commodity, that is, a dwelling, possesses more than one characteristic. The applicability of our
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su±cient condition, w-quasisupermdularity with respect to the value order, is obvious when
one intends to con¯rm the normality of a particular characteristic of dwellings. In this example,
the consumption set in terms of commodities is as follows. If there are m-types of dwellings,
the set of variations M = f0; 1; 2; :::;mg, where 0 2 M denotes the composite good. Since we
allow the consumer to choose only one dwelling, Y can be written as
Y = fy 2 R+ £ f0; 1gm j y(k) = 1) y(k0) = 0; k; k0 ¸ 1; 8k 6= k0g:
Example 23: Consider the model of the consumer theory with uncertainty in Antoniadou et
al. (2009). There exist two goods; one is deterministic and the other is subject to risk. The
consumption set is de¯ned as X = R+ £ Fy, where Fy is the set of distribution functions on
R+. In general, the price of lottery is determined by a nonlinear function py : Fy ! R+. Hence,
a price system is written as p(x; ~y) = pxx+ py(~y). According to Antoniadou et al. (2009), we
can consider the comparative criteria indicating the \quality" of lottery. In particular, consider
the \¯rst-order stochastic dominant" order ·FOSD on Fy. More precisely, for every ~y; ~y0 2 Fy,
~y ·FOSD ~y0 if Fy(s) ¸ Fy0(s) for every s 2 R+, where each Fy and Fy0 denote the distribution
function corresponding to the lottery ~y and ~y0 respectively. However, ·FOSD does not satisfy
the completeness. Hence, we must restrict the consumption set to X = R+ £ FCy , where
FCy ½ Fy denotes a chain with respect to ·FOSD. Then, by Proposition 19, if a utility function
satis¯es w-quasisupermodularity with respect to the (p;·FOSD)-value order, the demand for
lottery is normal with respect to the ¯rst-order stochastic dominance order. This is nothing
but the result in Antoniadou et al. (2009). Through the usage of the generalized monotone
comparative statics (Theorem 10), it is possible to extend the model such that contains multiple
lotteries without imposing any additional assumptions.
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4 Welfare Variations and Normality
In this section, we translate the su±cient condition in the previous section into more trans-
parent and economic concepts. Its key concept is the welfare variations, namely, the compensat-
ing variation, and equivalent variation for the change in the level of a particular characteristic.
In the ¯rst subsection, we explore the relationship between the su±cient condition for the nor-
mal demand and the properties of welfare variations in a general setting. Thus, we observe that
the w-quasisupermodularity of a utility function with respect to the (p;·j)-value order is char-
acterized by the \single-crossing property" of the welfare variations. In the second subsection,
we deal with the model in which the price system of characteristics is separable. It is shown
that, in this case, one can con¯rm the normality of a particular characteristic only with limited
information of the price system. More precisely, if the price of characteristic j is independent
of the level of other characteristics, one can derive the su±cient condition for the demand for
characteristic j to be normal without specifying the price system of that characteristic. In
fact, our results can be regarded as the generalization of the results by McConnell (1990) and
Whitehead (1995), that show the equivalency between normal demand and monotonicity of the
willingness to pay, or the compensating variation, by employing the di®erentiability and strict
quasiconcavity of a utility function. It is well known that the willingness to pay (the compen-
sating variation) and the willingness to accept (the equivalent variation) can be estimated by
the contingent valuation method, which is often employed in environmental economics. Hence,
the results in this section imply that, in principle, our su±cient condition for the normality
can be veri¯ed empirically.
4.1 Welfare Variations and w-Quasisupermodularity
Let us start by de¯ning the welfare variations for the change in the level of a particular char-
acteristic. Suppose that xj ; x0j 2 Xj and xj <j x0j . The compensating (equivalent) variation
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for the change from xj to x0j is de¯ned as follows. First, consider the maximization problem
max
x¡j2B¡j(p;w;xj)
U(x¡j ;xj);
where B¡j(p; w;xj) = fx¡j 2 X¡j j p(x¡j ; xj) · wg. Let V (p; w;xj) denote the value function
of this problem. For simplicity, we refer to this as an indirect utility function. Note that the
domain of V (p; ¢;xj) is the set of w such that B¡j(p; w;xj) 6= ;. Then, we de¯ne the welfare
variations as follows.
De¯nition 24: Let xj <j x0j and ¯x a price system p(¢) and an income level w > 0. The
compensating variation for the change from xj to x0j is de¯ned as
C(p; w; xj ; x0j) = maxfc j V (p; w ¡ c;x0j) = V (p; w;xj)g:
Similarly, the equivalent variation for the change from xj to x0j is de¯ned as
E(p; w; xj ; x0j) = minfe j V (p; w;x0j) = V (p; w + e;xj)g:
Under Assumption 12, the domains of C(p; ¢; xj ; x0j) and E(p; ¢; xj ; x0j) are equal to the domain
of V (p; ¢;x0j).
Although the de¯nitions of the welfare variations above appear to be similar to that in
McConnell (1990) and Whitehead (1995), they slightly di®er from the conventional de¯nitions,
as discussed in the next subsection. Note that the welfare variations in the above de¯nition may
be negative even if a utility function is increasing in xj , since the higher level of characteristic
j straightens the budget set B¡j , that is,
fx¡j 2 X¡j j p(x¡j ; xj) · wg ½ fx¡j 2 X¡j j p(x¡j ; x0j) · wg
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for every xj <j x0j . Then, we intend to explore the two properties of the welfare variations
with respect to income levels: nondecreasingness and the \single-crossing property". Both of
these properties can be characterized in terms of the properties of an indirect utility function.
Proposition 25: Fix a price system p(¢). Suppose that w < w0 and xj <j x0j satisfy
B¡j(p; w; x0j) 6= ;. Under Assumption 12, the compensating variation is nondecreasing in
w, that is, C(p; w; xj ; x0j) · C(p; w0; xj ; x0j), if and only if V satis¯es
V (p; w ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj)) V (p; w0 ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w0;xj)
for every c 2 R. Similarly, the equivalent variation is nondecreasing in income levels if and
only if the above condition is satis¯ed.
Proof First, we show the monotonicity of the compensating variation. Suppose that V satis¯es
the condition in the statement. Then, V (p; w ¡ C(p; w; xj ; x0j);x0j) = V (p; w;xj), and hence,
V (p; w0 ¡C(p; w; xj ; x0j);x0j) ¸ V (p; w0;xj). This implies that C(p; w; xj ; x0j) · C(p; w0; xj ; x0j).
To show the converse, suppose that V does not satisfy the condition in the statement.
Then, there exist some w < w0 and xj <j x0j such that V (p; w ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj) and
V (p; w ¡ c;x0j) < (·)V (p; w;xj) for some c 2 R. This implies that C(p; w; xj ; x0j) ¸ (>)c and
C(p; w0; xj ; x0j) < (·)c, and hence, we have C(p; w; xj ; x0j) > C(p; w0; xj ; x0j).
The nondecreasingness of the equivalent variation can be shown as follows. Let ¹w =
w¡C(p; w; xj ; x0j) and ¹w0 = w0¡C(p; w0; xj ; x0j). Then, w = ¹w+C(p; w; xj ; x0j) and w0 = ¹w0+
C(p; w0; xj ; x0j). Note that C(p; w; xj ; x
0
j) = E(p; ¹w; xj ; x
0
j) and C(p; w
0; xj ; x0j) = E(p; ¹w
0; xj ; x0j).
Since C(p; w; xj ; x0j) is nondecreasing in income levels if and only if V satis¯es the condition in
the statement, the monotonicity of E also follows. [Q.E.D.]
Corollary 26: Suppose that an indirect utility function V is increasing in w. Then, for given
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xj <j x
0
j, the absolute value of the equivalent variation is not smaller than the absolute value
of the compensating variation if and only if both the compensating variation C(p; w; xj ; x0j) and
the equivalent variation E(p; w; xj ; x0j) are nondecreasing in income levels.
Proof Under the assumption in the statement, the sign of the compensating variation and the
welfare variation is the same with each other. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that
C(p; w; xj ; x0j) > 0. Assume that both the welfare variations are nondecreasing in w. For every
w > 0, de¯ne w^ = w + E(p; w; xj ; x0j). Similar to the proof of the preceding proposition, we
have
C(p; w^; xj ; x0j) = E(p; w; xj ; x
0
j):
By assumption, w < w^, and hence,
C(p; w; xj ; x0j) · C(p; w^; xj ; x0j) = E(p; w; xj ; x0j):
To show the converse, suppose that C(p; w; xj ; x0j) > E(p; w; xj ; x
0
j) for some w > 0 and
xj <j x
0
j . This implies that
C(p; w; xj ; x0j) > C(p; w^; xj ; x
0
j) = E(p; w; xj ; x
0
j):
This violates the nondecreasingness of C(p; w; xj ; x0j). [Q.E.D.]
Then, we introduce the second property of welfare variations, namely, the single-crossing
property, which is de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 27: Fix a price system p(¢). The compensating variation C(p; w; xj ; x0j) satis¯es
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the single-crossing property in (xj ;w) if
C(p; w; xj ; x0j) ¸ (>)0) C(p; w0; xj ; x0j) ¸ (>)0
for every w < w0 and xj <j x0j satisfying B¡j(p; w; x
0
j) 6= ;. The single-crossing property of
the equivalent variation is similarly de¯ned.
The term \single-crossing property" stems from the fact that if the welfare variation satis-
¯es it, then it crosses 0 at most once from below. In fact, the single-crossing property of the
welfare variations is equivalent with the single-crossing property of the indirect utility func-
tion V (p; w;xj). Obviously, the single-crossing property is strictly weaker than the standard
monotonicity, since every monotonic function trivially satis¯es the single-crossing property. In
addition, if the sign of a function is constant, then it satis¯es the single-crossing property.
Proposition 28: Fix a price system p(¢). The compensating variation satis¯es the single-
crossing property in (xj ;w) if and only if V satis¯es the single-crossing property in (xj ;w),
that is, for every w < w0 and xj <j x0j satisfying B¡j(p; w; x
0
j) 6= ;,
V (p; w;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj)) V (p; w0;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w0;xj):
Similarly, the equivalent variation satis¯es the single-crossing property if and only if V satis¯es
the single-crossing property in (xj ;w).
Proof First, we show the case with the compensating variation. Suppose that V satis¯es the
single-crossing property in (xj ;w). Let w < w0 and C(p; w; xj ; x0j) ¸ (>)0. This implies that
V (p; w;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj). By the single-crossing property of V , we have V (p; w0;x0j) ¸ (>
)V (p; w0;xj). This implies that C(p; w; xj ; x0j) ¸ (>)0.
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To show the converse, suppose that V does not satisfy the single-crossing property. Then,
there exist some w < w0 and xj <j x0j such that V (p; w;x
0
j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj) and V (p; w0;x0j) <
(·)V (p; w0;xj). The former inequation V (p; w;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj) implies that C(p; w; xj ; x0j) ¸
(>)0, while the latter inequation implies that C(p; w; xj ; x0j) < (·)0.
The proof for the case with the equivalent variation is omitted because it is the same as
that for the above argument, except that each of C(p; w; xj ; x0j) and C(p; w
0; xj ; x0j) are replaced
with E(p; w; xj ; x0j) and E(p; w
0; xj ; x0j) respectively. [Q.E.D.]
With one additional assumption, we can characterize the w-quasisupermodularity of a utility
function with respect to the (p;·j)-value order by the single-crossing property of the welfare
variations.
Assumption 29: For every xj 2 Xj , the maximization problem maxB¡j(p;w;xj) U(x¡j ; xj) has
at least one solution x¤¡j such that p(x
¤
¡j ; xj) = w.
Theorem 30: Fix a price system p(¢). Then, under Assumptions 12, 14, and 29, a utility
function U satis¯es w-quasisupermodularity with respect to (p;·j)-value order if and only if
V (p; w;xj) satis¯es the single-crossing property in (xj ;w).
Proof First, we show the \if" part. Let x; x0 2 X. Suppose that xj > x0j and p(x) < p(x0).
Since ·j is a price increasing criterion, xj <j x0j . De¯ne xt
¤
and xa
¤
such that
xt
¤
¡j 2 argmax
z¡j2B¡j(p;p(x);x0j)
U(z¡j ;x0j);
xa
¤
¡j 2 argmax
z¡j2B¡j(p;p(x0);xj)
U(z¡j ;xj);
with xt
¤
j = x
0
j and x
a¤
j = xj . By Assumption 29, we can assume that p(x
t¤) = p(x) and
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p(xa
¤
) = p(x0). It is obvious that xt¤ 2 Tx;x0 and xa¤ 2 Ax;x0 . In the following, we prove that
U(x) ¸ (>)U(xt¤)) U(xa¤) ¸ (>)U(x0):
By the analogy of xt
¤
and xa
¤
, we de¯ne x¤ and x0¤ such that
x¤¡j 2 argmax
z¡j2B¡j(p;p(x);xj)
U(z¡j ;xj);
x
0¤
¡j 2 argmax
z¡j2B¡j(p;p(x0);x0j)
U(z¡j ;x0j);
with x¤j = xj and x
0¤
j = x
0
j . Since U(x
t¤) = V (p; p(x);x0j), U(x
a¤) = V (p; p(x0);xj), U(x¤) =
V (p; p(x);xj), and U(x
0¤) = V (p; p(x0);x0j), by the single-crossing property, we have
U(x¤) ¸ (>)U(xt¤) () V (p; p(x);xj) ¸ (>)V (p; p(x);x0j)
) V (p; p(x0);xj) ¸ (>)V (p; p(x0);x0j)
() U(xa¤) ¸ (>)U(x0¤):
By de¯nition, if U(x) ¸ (>)U(t) for all t 2 Tx;x0 , then U(x¤) ¸ (>)U(xt¤). The above
inequations imply that U(xa
¤
) ¸ (>)U(x0) in such cases.
To show the converse, suppose that V does not satisfy the single-crossing property. With-
out loss of generality, we can assume V (p; w;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj) and V (p; w0;x0j) < (·
)V (p; w0;xj). Then, the inequations at the end of the previous paragraph imply that U(x¤) ¸
(>)U(xt
¤
) and U(xa
¤
) < (·)U(x0¤). This implies that U does not satisfy w-quasisupermodularity.
[Q.E.D.]
Corollary 31: Fix a price system p(¢). Then, under Assumptions 12, 14, and 29, the following
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statements are equivalent.
1. An indirect utility function V satis¯es the single-crossing property in (xj ;w).
2. The welfare variations satis¯es the single-crossing property in (xj ;w).
3. A utility function satis¯es w-quasisupermodularity with respect to the (p;·j)-value order.
Each of these statements implies that the demand for characteristic j is pathwisely normal. In
addition, if the demand for characteristic j is unique, the converse also follows.
Corollary 32: Fix a price system p(¢). Then, under Assumptions 12, 14, and 29, the following
statements are equivalent.
1. An indirect utility function V satis¯es the condition
V (p; w ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj)) V (p; w0 ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w0;xj)
for every w < w0, xj <j x0j satisfying B¡j(p; w; x
0
j) 6= ;.
2. For every xj <j x0j, the welfare variations are nondecreasing in w as long as they are
de¯ned.
3. Suppose that V is increasing in w. For every xj <j x0j, the absolute value of the equivalent
variation is not smaller than the absolute value of the compensating variation (as long as
they are de¯ned).
Each of these statements implies the statements in the previous corollary, and hence, implies
the normality of the demand for characteristic j.
The preceding corollaries imply that one can ensure the normality of the demand for a
particular characteristic by investigating the properties of the welfare variations. It seems that
the single-crossing property of an indirect utility function and the welfare variations are more
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transparent than the w-quasisupermodularity of a direct utility function with respect to the
(p;·j)-value order. However, it should be emphasized that employing the generalized monotone
comparative statics, speci¯cally, the (p;·j)-value order, enables us to derive the su±cient
conditions in terms of the welfare variations. The next subsection shows that our results can
be regarded as an extension of the relationship between monotone comparative statics of the
willingness to pay and monotone comparative statics of the demand; this technique is often
applied in the literature of environmental economics, particularly in relation to the contingent
valuation method. In this case the relationship between our de¯nition of the welfare variations
and the conventional welfare variations employed in McConnell (1990) and Whitehead (1995),
plays an important role.
4.2 In the Case of Separable Price Systems
The su±cient conditions for the normality stated in the previous subsection depend on
the speci¯cation of the price system of characteristics. On the other hand, as long as additive
separability is imposed on the price systems, we can derive the su±cient condition for normality
only with limited information of the price system. In the rest of this section, we assume that
the price systems of characteristics can be written as p(x¡j ; xj) = p¡j(x¡j) + pj(xj), which
we refer to as the separability of the price of characteristic j. First, we slightly modify the
de¯nition of the welfare variations. For every xj 2 Xj , consider the maximization problem
max
x¡j2 ~B¡j(p;w¡j)
U(x¡j ;xj);
where ~B¡j(p; w¡j) = fx¡j j p¡j(x¡j) · w¡jg. Let ~V (p; w¡j ; xj) be the value function of
the above problem. We refer to this as a conventional indirect utility function in order to
distinguish it from an indirect utility function V in the previous subsection. Needless to say,
the domain of ~V (p; ¢;xj) is the set fw¡j j ~B¡j(p; w¡j) 6= ;g. Then, in the followings, we de¯ne
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the welfare variations based on ~V (p; w¡j ;xj), which is the direct generalization of the de¯nition
of the welfare variations in McConnell (1990) and Whitehead (1995).
De¯nition 33: Let xj <j x0j . The conventional compensating variation for the change from
xj to x0j is de¯ned as
~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) = maxf~c j ~V (p; w¡j ¡ ~c;x0j) = ~V (p; w¡j ;xj)g:
Similarly, the conventional equivalent variation for the change from xj to x0j is de¯ned as
~E(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) = minf~e j ~V (p; w¡j ;x0j) = ~V (p; w¡j + ~e;xj)g:
Note that, by de¯nition, the conventional welfare variations are independent of the speci-
¯cation of the price of characteristic j, pj(¢). It should be also noted that, in contrast to the
welfare variations in the previous subsection, the conventional welfare variations are always
positive if a utility function is increasing in xj .
Example 34: Consider the simpli¯ed version of the model of Whitehead (1995), which com-
prises three goods, namely, x: the recreational use of a natural resource whose unit price is px,
q: the natural resource quality characteristic, and z: the num¶eraire composite good. Consider
the utility maximization problem
max
x;z
U(x; z; q)
s:t: pxx+ z · w¡q
and de¯ne its value function as ~V (p; w¡q; q). Then, the willingness to pay (WTP) for the
change from q0 to q1 is de¯ned as the conventional compensating variation, which in turn is
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de¯ned as
~C(px; w¡q; q0; q1) = maxf~c j ~V (p; w¡q ¡ ~c; q1) = ~V (p; w¡q; q0)g
for every q0 <q q1. In this example, the quality of the environment q is nonmarketed good,
and hence, one cannot observe the price system that explicitly includes q. McConnell (1990)
and Whitehead (1995) prove that the monotonicity of ~C in ~w¡j for every q0 < q1 is the
necessary and su±cient condition for the normality of q under every increasing pq > 0 with
the assumptions of an increasing, strictly quasiconcave and twice continuously di®erentiable
utility function.
As observed in the preceding example, if the su±cient condition for normality employing
~C (or ~E) is constructed, one can perform comparative statics analysis only with limited in-
formation of price systems. In fact, provided the separability of the price of characteristic j
holds, we can extend the results of McConnell and Whitehead to our setting. To prove this, we
clarify the relationship between comparative statics of the conventional welfare variations and a
conventional indirect utility function. The proofs of the following two statements are omitted,
since they are almost the same as those of Proposition 25 and Corollary 26 respectively.
Proposition 35: Fix a price system p(¢) and suppose that the price of characteristic j is sep-
arable and that ~B¡j(p; w¡j) 6= ;. The conventional welfare variation is nondecreasing in w¡j,
that is, ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) · ~C(p; w0¡j ; xj ; x0j) if and only if ~V satis¯es
~V (p; w¡j ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>) ~V (p; w¡j ;xj)) ~V (p; w0¡j ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>) ~V (p; w0¡j ;xj)
for every xj <j x0j, w¡j < w
0
¡j, and c 2 R. Similarly, the conventional equivalent variation is
nondecreasing in income levels if and only if the above condition is satis¯ed.
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Corollary 36: Suppose that a conventional indirect utility function ~V is increasing in w¡j
and/or xj. Then, for given xj <j x0j, the absolute value of the conventional equivalent variation
is not smaller than the absolute value of the conventional compensating variation for every
xj <j x
0
j if and only if the conventional welfare variations are nondecreasing in w¡j.
Combined with Corollary 32, the following proposition ensures that the monotonicity of
the conventional welfare variations under the price system p(x) = p¡j(x¡j) + pj(xj) is the
su±cient condition for the normality of characteristic j for every price system p0(¢) such that
p0(x) = p¡j(x¡j) + p0j(xj) and satis¯es Assumptions 12, 14, and 29.
Proposition 37: Fix a price system p(¢) and suppose that the price of characteristic j is sepa-
rable. Then, under Assumptions 12 and 14, the conventional compensating (equivalent) varia-
tion ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) ( ~E(p; w¡j ; xj ; x
0
j)) is nondecreasing in w¡j if and only if C(p
0; w; xj ; x0j)
(E(p0; w; xj ; x0j)) is nondecreasing in w for every price system p
0(¢) such that p0¡j(x¡j) =
p¡j(x¡j).
Proof Let w = w¡j + pj(xj). Then, ~V (p; w¡j ;xj) = V (p; w; xj) and ~V (p; w¡j ;x0j) = V (p; w +
pj(x0j)¡ pj(xj)). Hence, we have
V
³
p; w + pj(x0j)¡ pj(xj)¡ ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j);x0j
´
= V (p; w;xj);
implies that
C(p; w; xj ; x0j) = ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x
0
j) + pj(xj)¡ pj(x0j):
Hence, C(p; w; xj ; x0j) is nondecreasing in w if and only if ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x
0
j) in w¡j . In addition,
~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) is independent of the price of characteristic j, and hence, our claim follows.
[Q.E.D.]
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Corollary 38: Fix a price system p(¢) and suppose that the price of characteristic j is separable.
Then, under Assumptions 12, 14, and 29, the following statements are equivalent.
1. An indirect utility function V satis¯es
V (p0; w ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p0; w;xj)) V (p0; w0 ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p0; w0;xj)
for every p0(¢) such that p0¡j(¢) = p¡j(¢), 0 < w < w0, xj < x0j satisfying B¡j(p; w; x0j) 6= ;,
and c 2 R.
2. A conventional indirect utility function ~V satis¯es
~V (p; w¡j ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>) ~V (p; w¡j ;xj)) ~V (p; w0¡j ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>) ~V (p; w0¡j ;xj)
for every 0 < w¡j < w0¡j, xj <j x
0
j satisfying ~B¡j(p; w¡j) 6= ; and c 2 R.
3. The welfare variations are nondecreasing in w for every xj <j x0j and p
0(¢) such that
p0¡j(¢) = p¡j(¢), as long as it is de¯ned.
4. The conventional welfare variations are nondecreasing in w¡j for every xj <j x0j and p
0(¢)
such that p0¡j(¢) = p¡j(¢), as long as it is de¯ned.
5. For every xj <j x0j, the absolute value of the conventional equivalent variation is not
smaller than the absolute value of the conventional compensating variation under the
condition that ~V is increasing in w¡j and/or xj.
Each of these statements implies pathwise normality of the demand for characteristic j.
Although one may question the relationship between the single-crossing property of the
conventional welfare variations and monotone comparative statics of characteristic demand,
the single-crossing property does not necessarily imply normality. Indeed, even if ~C satis¯es
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the single-crossing property in (xj ;w¡j), the compensating variation C does not necessar-
ily satisfy the single-crossing property in (xj ;w). For instance, let 0 < ~C(p; w0¡j ; xj ; x
0
j) <
~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) for some w ¡ pj(xj) = w¡j < w0¡j = w0 ¡ pj(xj), which does not violate
the single-crossing property. However, in this case, it is possible that C(p; w0; xj ; x0j) < 0 <
C(p; w; xj ; x0j), since ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x
0
j) = C(p; w; xj ; x
0
j)+pj(xj)¡pj(x0j) and pj(xj)¡pj(x0j) < 0.
Under a weak additional condition, the monotonicity of the welfare variations can be char-
acterized in terms of the single-crossing property. That is, the following implies that the
monotonicity of the conventional welfare variations is the necessary and su±cient condition for
monotone income e®ects under the uniqueness of demand.
Proposition 39: Fix a price system p(¢) and suppose that the price of characteristic j is sep-
arable and that a utility function is increasing in xj. Then, under Assumptions 12 and 14, the
conventional compensating (equivalent) variation ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) ( ~E(p; w¡j ; xj ; x
0
j)) is non-
decreasing in w¡j if and only if C(p0; w; xj ; x0j) (E(p
0; w; xj ; x0j)) satis¯es the single-crossing
property in (xj ;w) for every price system p0(¢) = p¡j(x¡j) + p0j(xj).
Proof We show the \only if" part. Suppose that ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) > ~C(p; w
0
¡j ; xj ; x
0
j) for some
w¡j < w0¡j . Since a utility function is increasing in xj , ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x
0
j) > 0. De¯ne p
0
j(¢) such
that
~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) > p
0
j(x
0
j)¡ p0j(xj)
~C(p; w0¡j ; xj ; x
0
j) < p
0
j(x
0
j)¡ p0j(xj):
Then, by letting w = w¡j+p0j(xj) and w
0 = w¡j+p0j(xj), C(p
0; w; xj ; x0j) > 0 and C(p
0; w0; xj ; x0j) <
0; this violates the single-crossing property in (xj ;w).
The converse can be easily shown by letting p0 = p, and the case with the equivalent
variation can be denoted in a similar fashion. [Q.E.D.]
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Corollary 40: Suppose that the price of characteristic j is separable, and that a utility function
is increasing in xj. Fix a price system p(¢). Then, under Assumptions 12, 14, and 29, the
following statements are equivalent.
1. An indirect utility function V satis¯es the single-crossing property in (xj ;w).
2. An indirect utility function V satis¯es
V (p; w ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w;xj)) V (p; w0 ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>)V (p; w0;xj)
for every 0 < w < w0, xj < x0j satisfying B(p; w; x
0
j) 6= ; and c 2 R.
3. A conventional indirect utility function ~V satis¯es
~V (p; w¡j ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>) ~V (p; w¡j ;xj)) ~V (p; w0¡j ¡ c;x0j) ¸ (>) ~V (p; w0¡j ;xj)
for every 0 < w¡j < w0¡j, xj <j x
0
j satisfying ~B¡j(p; w) 6= ; and c 2 R.
4. The welfare variations satisfy the single-crossing property in (xj ;w) for every p0(¢) such
that p0¡j(¢) = p¡j(¢).
5. The welfare variations are nondecreasing in w for every xj <j x0j and p
0(¢) such that
p0¡j(¢) = p¡j(¢).
6. The conventional welfare variations are nondecreasing in w¡j for every xj <j x0j and p
0(¢)
such that p0¡j(¢) = p¡j(¢), as long as it is de¯ned.
7. For every xj <j x0j, the absolute value of the conventional equivalent variation is not
smaller than the absolute value of the conventional compensating variation.
8. For every xj <j x0j, the absolute value of the equivalent variation is not smaller than the
abosolute value of the compensating variation.
40
9. A utility function U satis¯es w-quasisupermodularity with respect to the (p0;·j)-value
order for every p0(¢) such that p0¡j(¢) = p¡j(¢).
Each of these statements implies pathwise normality of the demand for characteristic j. If the
demand for characteristic j is unique, the converse also follows.
As mentioned in Example 34, the conventional welfare variations ~C(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) and
~E(p; w¡j ; xj ; x0j) are clearly the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept respectively.
In the literature of environmental economics, numerous studies have estimated these variables
by using the contingent valuation method, and hence, it is possible, at least theoretically, to
empirically verfy our su±cient condition in this subsection. Although the properties of the
welfare variations in the previous subsection might be veri¯ed in a similar fashion, it should
be noted that estimating the welfare variations C and E requires the speci¯cation of the price
system of characteristics. In particular, the change of the set B¡j(p; w; ¢) along with the change
in the level of characteristic j must be taken into account. Finally, we apply the results in this
section to the examples.
Example 11 (continued): In this example, the price system can be written as p(x1; yc) =
p1(x1) + yc, where x1 denotes the level of air-conditioning capacity. Hence, the results in this
subsection can be applied by our assumption on the price system of air-conditioning commodi-
ties. If the conventional welfare variations are nondecreasing in w¡1 for every x1 < x01, the
demand for air-conditioning capacity is pathwisely normal. Monotone comparative statics of
the demand for commodities can be checked by applying Proposition 20. By our assumption,
when EF and AC are the commodities that generate the air-conditining capacity, the latter
satis¯es the condition in Proposition 20, and hence, it is a normal good. If NAC is introduced
in the economy, the demand for NAC is pathwisely normal, while the demand for AC is not
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normal in this case.
Example 21 (continued): Fix the unit prices pk (k 6= j). If the conventional welfare vari-
ations are nondecreasing in w¡j for every xj <j x0j , then the demand for commodity j is
pathwisely normal for every pj > 0. If the demand for commodity j is always unique, then the
converse follows.
Example 22 (continued): Let xj be a qualitative characteristic of a dwelling. Since, in this
example, the price system is not necessarily separable, we must employ the results of Section
4.1. If the welfare variations satisfy the single-crossing property in (xj ;w), then the demand
for characteristic j is pathwisely normal, and hence, the dwellings satisfying the condition of
Proposition 20 are normal goods.
Example 23 (continued): Recall that, in this example, the price systems can be written
as p(x; ~y) = pxx + py(~y). Suppose that py(~y) < py(~y0) if ~y <FOSD ~y0. By de¯nition of the
¯rst-order stochastic dominance, a utility function is increasing with respect to ·FOSD. Thus,
Corollary 40 can be applied. The demand for lottery is pathwisely normal for every increasing
lottery price system p0y(¢) if the conventional welfare variations for the improvements of the
lottery in the sense of the ¯rst-order stochastic dominance is nondecreasing in w¡y. If the
lottery demand is always unique, then the converse also follows. This result implies that the
su±cient condition in Antoniadou et al. (2009), namely \the quasisupermodularity of a utility
function with respect to the (p;·FOSD)-value order," can be applied for every price system
p0(¢) such that p0x = px and satis¯es Assumptions 12, 14, and 29.
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